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INFORMALITY AS A BILATERAL
ASSURANCE MECHANISM
Comments on Ronald Mann's
'The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions'
Avery Wiener Katz*
Ronald Mann's study of documentary defects in the presentation
of commercial letters of credit1 is a valuable contribution to the
commercial law literature in at least three respects. First, it offers a
detailed and thorough empirical survey of an important though
specialized aspect of commercial practice. Mann collected and coded
a data sample of 500 randomly selected letter-of-credit transactions,
personally evaluating each transaction to determine whether the
documentary presentation by the beneficiary of the letter of credit
(i.e., the seller) complied with the letter's formal terms. Then, for each
case in which he found one or more documentary defects, Mann went
on to classify the defects and to evaluate their commercial and
practical significance. He also measured how quickly and readily the
issuing bank and the applicant (i.e., the buyer) responded to - and
ultimately waived - the defects, in addition to collecting various other
information about the transaction and the parties involved. The
creation of this data set required significant time, effort, and both
professional and scholarly judgment; and the result is a level and
quality of information that goes substantially beyond the qualitative
information gleaned from his interviews with bank officers, not to
mention the anecdotal information that motivated the study in the first
place.
Second, Mann has not just produced a dry collection of business
facts. Rather, in showing that the beneficiaries of letters of credit
routinely fail to present documents that comply with the terms of the
underlying letter and that the applicants and issuing banks just as
routinely waive the resulting defects, he has convincingly documented
an important and counterintuitive empirical regularity about
commercial letters of credit - one that substantially undercuts the
conventional teaching in the area that the purpose of the letter of
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law (avkatz@law.columbia.edu). I
am grateful to Lisa Bernstein and Clay Gillette for helpful discussions, and to Ronald Mann
and the editors of the University of Michigan Law Review for organizing the Symposium on
Empirical Research in Commercial Transactions for which these comments were prepared.
1. See Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2494 (2000) [hereinafter Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit].
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credit is to provide the beneficiary with a guaranty of payment that is
legally enforceable against the issuing bank. His findings are striking,
provocative, and persuasive enough to demand explanation and, thus,
to force a revision of the conventional scholarly wisdom in this area.
Third, Mann has put forward a theoretical account of letters of
credit, grounded in the modem economics of information and based
on his prior work in other areas of commercial law, that is both more
nuanced and conceptually more sophisticated than is the conventional
scholarly view. His explanation is that the value of letters of credit in
assuring beneficiaries of payment does not lie primarily in their legal
significance, but rather in their practical significance. More
specifically, the willingness of a bank to issue a letter of credit serves
as a credible signal, enforced by an implicit reputational bond, of the
issuer's private information that the applicant is a reliable creditor;
and this signal is more important to the beneficiary in practical terms
than is any right to collect directly from the bank. To use Mann's own
terminology, the letter of credit is primarily a verification institution,
not a guaranty institution3 This explanation is creative, interesting,
and as far as I know, original. It may be that Mann's explanation, as
he suggests at various points, will be regarded as old news by
practicing commercial specialists in the letter-of-credit area. Even if
this is so, however, and even if his explanation is incomplete or
incorrect, he has significantly advanced the state of the scholarly
literature on this topic.
In these comments, I argue that the theoretical account of letters of
credit that Mann offers, while instructive and suggestive, is indeed
incomplete. In particular, Mann's theory does not explain why parties
contracting at a distance would want to use a commercial letter of
credit as their mechanism for verifying information relevant to the
extension of credit, as opposed to some other device. Similarly, his
account does not explain why, given that the parties have chosen to
use a letter of credit to signal the buyer's reliability, they would avoid
the presumably stronger signal of making the letter legally binding.
Indeed, as Mann himself tells us, if the parties' main purpose is to
provide the seller with assurance that the buyer will pay, there are
easier and cheaper means through which to provide such assurance.
Thus, his information-verification theory fails to explain all of the facts
he uncovers in his empirical research, and to the extent it is consistent
with his findings, it would be equally consistent with other findings if
not more so.
The reason why Mann's explanation is incomplete, I also argue, is
that he focuses on only half of the incentive problem inherent in the
stereotypical commercial letter-of-credit transaction. When parties
2. See generally Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87
GEO. L.J. 2225 (1999) [hereinafter Mann, Verification Institutions].
August 2000] 2555
Michigan Law Review
deal at a distance, there is risk on both sides. The seller faces the risk
that she will ship goods for which the buyer will not pay, leaving her
with the relatively ineffective remedy of a lawsuit in a distant and
unfamiliar jurisdiction; this is the problem on which Mann focuses.
But the buyer faces the corresponding risk that he will pay for goods
that are defective or that the seller does not even ship? Either party
could reduce or even eliminate this risk by insisting that the other
party perform first; for instance, the seller could insist that the buyer
prepay, or the buyer could insist that the seller ship on open account
and that payment be due only after the buyer is satisfied that the
goods conform to the underlying contract. Intermediate arrangements
will give less protection to one party and more to the other. But there
is no arrangement that will provide complete assurance to both; the
difficulty lies in the very fact that the parties deal at a distance, which
both makes it impossible for them to perform simultaneously, and
renders the usual legal remedy for breach of contract - a lawsuit for
damages or specific performance - ineffective in practical terms.
What Mann omits, in his focus on the seller's need to verify the
reliability of her buyer, is that the commercial letter of credit is a
bilateral assurance mechanism - one that, more or less, splits the
difference between prepayment and shipment on open account. When
the bilateral nature of the risk inherent in long-distance transactions is
taken into account, the use of letters of credit, as well as the fact that
in most instances they are honored despite technical noncompliance
with their documentary conditions, becomes substantially more
understandable.
1. WHY USE A LETTER OF CREDIT AT ALL?
As a vast theoretical and empirical literature in law and in
economics makes plain, imperfect information is a primary
institutional consideration in credit markets. According to the
standard economic theory of risk bearing, creditors who lack
individualized information about their debtors' risk profiles or post-
credit behavior will be unable to price credit terms correctly or
provide incentives for optimal precaution and risk taking by debtors
over the life of the loan. As a result, the price of credit will generally
include a premium for anticipated suboptimal behavior by the debtor
(moral hazard) as well as a cross-subsidy from low-risk to high-risk
debtors that inefficiently discourages the former from applying for
credit in the first place (adverse selection). These informational
transaction costs arise not just in explicit credit markets, but in any
3. In order to avoid ambiguity, when discussing generic transactions, I adopt the
convention of referring to buyers, letter-of-credit applicants, and other debtors with male
pronouns; sellers, letter-of-credit beneficiaries, and other creditors with female pronouns;
and banks and other intermediaries with neuter pronouns.
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contractual relationship that includes an implicit credit element - that
is, in any contract where performance is not completely simultaneous.4
Reducing such costs to manageable proportions, accordingly, will in
many instances be crucial to the success of the overall contract.
The problems of adverse selection and moral hazard are likely to
be especially significant when parties contract at a distance. The
difficulty of verifying information about a far-off and unfamiliar
location, organized according to local conventions and possibly in a
different language; the problems of collecting at a distance and
navigating a foreign legal system; and the relative infrequency of such
transactions, making it difficult to cover the overhead costs of
investigation and enforcement or to establish a credible business
reputation, all combine to make reliance on ex post legal enforcement
an especially cumbersome tool to ensure compliance with contractual
obligations. Thus Mann's observation that long-distance sellers would
have special concerns about the reliability and creditworthiness of
their buyers, and would accordingly have special need for devices that
address these concerns, is both intuitive and empirically plausible.
As both the practice of and the literature on commercial
transactions attests, however, and as Mann himself has documented
more fully in another context, a host of legal and commercial
institutions are available to serve this accreditation function.5 One
such institution is secured credit, under which the debtor offers
specific property as collateral for his loan, thus providing a source of
funds out of which the creditor may satisfy her debt in the event of
default, as well as, under most systems of secured credit, a relatively
expedited process for collection.6 Another such institution is the
contractual guaranty, under which a third party undertakes a
secondary obligation to pay the debt if the primary debtor does not.7
A third device is the posting of a bond, to be forfeited to the creditor,
to a third party, or even destroyed in the event of breach or other
debtor misbehavior! A fourth is the use of contractual intermediaries
4. See generally Y. Kotowitz, Moral Hazard, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A
DICIONARY OF ECONOMICS 549 (J. Eatwell et al. eds., 1987); Charles Wilson, Adverse
Selection, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 32 (J. Eatweil et al.
eds., 1987).
5. See generally Mann, Verification Institutions, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Ronald Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86
GEO. LJ. 1 (1997); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 901 (1986); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of
Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981); Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of
Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1992).
7. See generally Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66
U. Cm. L. REv. 47 (1999).
8. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 730 (1989) [hereinafter Scott, Coercive Creditor Remedies] (applying theory
to context of debtor-creditor law in particular); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible
2557August2000]
Michigan Law Review
who have some link to the unknown debtor, whether through past
transactional experience, common ethnic identity, or membership in a
trade association, and who themselves are known or who have an
established commercial reputation.' And a fifth alternative is the
direct acquisition of knowledge, whether through personal investment,
gossip, or a direct purchase from a specialist in the collection and
processing of commercial information, such as Dun and Bradstreet or
other credit reporting agencies.
Each of these alternatives alleviates the problems of moral hazard
and adverse selection in various ways: by lowering the creditor's cost
of collection (secured credit, third-party guaranties), raising the cost to
the debtor of engaging in suboptimal behavior (bonds, collateral), or
signaling private information of the debtor and third parties (all of the
above, in that a party's willingness to assume special risk in the event
of default credibly reveals his or its belief that such risk is low). They
can be used separately or in concert, as when a applicant for an
automobile loan is asked to provide credit references, to make a
substantial down payment, to grant the lender a security interest in the
car, to sign a promissory note, and in some cases to provide a co-
signer. Most of them are sufficiently flexible, furthermore, so as to
accommodate a variety of practical and legal forms. For instance, a
bond can be posted in the form of out-of-pocket funds (as with a
landlord's security deposit or a down payment), of a relationship-
specific physical asset the value of which will be destroyed if the
contract is discontinued or not renewed (as when a railroad builds a
special spur to reach a particular mine or wellhead), of deferred
compensation or future expected profits (as when an employer offers a
pension for long-term service or a commercial buyer holds out the
prospect of repeat business as a reward for high quality), or of
reputation in the relevant commercial community (as when breach of
contract can get one gossiped about or expelled from a trade
association).
Given this rich variety of alternative verification and guaranty
devices, therefore, a long-distance seller's need for information
regarding her buyer does not explain, let alone predict, the use of the
commercial letter of credit in particular. In order to provide such an
Commitments: Using Hostages To Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983)
(developing general theory of bond posting).
9. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 138-143 (1992) (detailing the role
of trade associations and commercial experience in private contractual enforcement); Janet
T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional
Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981) (detailing the informational role
of ethnic middlemen); Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in
Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 525 (1993) (detailing the




explanation, one would have to show that the letter of credit is
cheaper than its alternatives, more reliable, or both. And in this
regard, Mann's evidence is neither apposite nor helpful. Because his
data look only at letters of credit, and are drawn from the files of the
issuing banks rather than from the files of the buyer-applicants or
seller-beneficiaries, they cannot tell us how or why these buyers and
sellers choose to use letters of credit rather than (or, in conjunction
with) these other devices.
More problematically, as Mann himself explains, the letter of credit
is a relatively expensive verification device. Its price is typically set at
a low but constant percentage of the amount at risk in the underlying
sales transaction, which means that in large transactions the cost to the
parties can reach thousands of dollars. 10 In contrast, documents of title
cost in the neighborhood of one-tenth that amount; and their price
does not increase with the size of the transaction." A simple letter of
reference printed on the bank's ordinary letterhead stationery would
be even cheaper. Such alternate devices do not provide the seller with
the same legal protections as does the letter of credit, to be sure, but
under Mann's account it is bank reputation and not potential legal
liability that does the informational work. There is no reason why
credit references, title documents, or a host of other commercial
documents regularly issued by banks could not carry (or could not be
invested by the parties with) reputational weight in the same way that
Mann suggests that letters of credit do and are. 2 Why then, don't the
parties use such cheap and readily available devices to provide the
necessary verification, instead of the relatively expensive letter of
credit?
10. See Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit, supra, note 1, at 2499. Though the payment
for a letter of credit is formally paid by the buyer-applicant, its cost is ultimately shared
between the buyer and seller. As a general matter, the surplus from exchange tends to be
divided among contracting parties in proportion to their relative eagerness to enter into the
bargain (and in competitive markets, by their elasticities of supply and demand). Any
transaction costs from exchange, or efficiency gains or losses resulting from a change in legal
regime, accordingly, will be shared by all. See generally Richard Craswell, Passing on the
Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 361 (1991).
11. See Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit, supra note 1, at 2508.
12. In a footnote to the latest version of his article, prepared after these comments were
orally delivered, Mann acknowledges the theoretical force of this objection, but replies that
the answer simply lies in the brute empirical fact that in the commercial world, letters of
credit are understood to carry such weight and other documents are not. See Mann, The
Role of Letters of Credit, supra note 1, at 2529 n.118. This response, however, obviously fails
to explain why this conventional understanding exists, and why the understanding is not or
could not be different, given the apparent availability of cheaper and equally effective
methods for signaling the same information.
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2. WHY USE A LETTER OF CREDIT AND THEN NOT MAKE IT
LEGALLY BINDING?
Conversely, Mann's information-verification theory does not
explain why the parties would go to the expense of obtaining a letter
of credit, and then write it and use it in a way that deprives it of its
main formal advantage - that is, legal enforceability against the
issuing bank. It is no answer to say that the parties are primarily
interested in signaling the buyer's creditworthiness, and that the
bank's mere willingness to issue a letter of credit provides such a
signal. For the issuance of a letter of credit, backed up by legal
liability on the part of the bank, would provide an even stronger
signal. After all, the greater the penalty paid to the bank in the event
of the buyer's default, the more credible is its representation that the
chance of default is low. A bank that stands immediately to lose out of
pocket the face value of a letter of credit, and not just in the long-run
reputational sense, will have sharper incentives to monitor the buyer
and ensure his compliance with the underlying sales contract. It will
also have sharper incentives to screen buyers before agreeing to issue
the letter in the first place. A bank that assumes both legal and
reputational liability will have sharper incentives yet.
If the response is that the seller does not need a perfect signal of
the buyer's reliability, but only a sufficient one, the puzzle remains.
For then the question becomes one of efficiency - how can the bank
send a sufficiently reliable signal at lowest cost? And if we consider
this question more closely, one finds again that a letter of credit
backed up by reputational sanctions alone is a relatively expensive
method of signaling. This is because the effectiveness of a
reputational sanction requires that the party with the reputation (here,
the bank) anticipate some supranormal profits (or more technically,
economic rents) on its future operations. Otherwise, it has no
incentive to spend resources or forego current profits to keep up its
reputation. Indeed, the strength of a party's incentive to keep up its
reputation, properly understood, is directly proportional to the
expected future profits that serve as an effective bond for that
reputation.
To illustrate with a numerical example: consider a bank that issues
a $1 million letter of credit. In order for reputation alone to provide
an incentive to honor this obligation, the issuing bank must have at
stake an anticipated $1 million of profits on future letter-of-credit
transactions, else in the event of a dispute it would prefer to forego
these future transactions and to default on its current obligation. This
$1 million, furthermore, must take the form of supranormal profits,
measured as a premium over the ordinary market return to capital.
Otherwise the bank could simply recoup its losses by engaging in
alternate financial or commercial activities. In order for it to
2560 [Vol. 98:2554
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anticipate earning such profits in the future, the bank must plan to
charge a price that exceeds its future expected costs of doing business,
including normal returns to capital. Specifically, it must charge a
markup that, when summed over all future transactions of the same
type and discounted to present value, adds up to $1 million. The per-
unit markup will of course depend on the number of similar
transactions it engages in, together with its discount rate and the
fraction of business that lies at stake in a potential default. For
instance, if the bank engages in 1,000 transactions of the same type per
year, faces a discount rate of 10%, and anticipates that a single default
would result in the loss of all future business of this sort, the required
markup would be $100 per transaction. 3 A larger issuer that engaged
in 5,000 such transactions per year would only have to charge a
markup of $20; while a smaller issuer spreading this cost over only 200
transactions per year would have to charge a higher markup of $500.
The assumption that a buyer's refusal to pay on a single letter of
credit would cost the issuing bank its entire future letter-of-credit
business, of course, is unrealistic. An alternative assumption of a 5%
loss in future business (probably still too high, given the geographic
separation of beneficiaries, the heterogeneity of buyers and sellers
using the letter-of-credit device, the difficulty of determining the
validity of the buyer's refusal in the absence of an authoritative public
hearing, and the difficulty of allocating blame for the refusal between
the buyer and the bank) would imply a markup of $2,000 for the
medium-size issuer, 400 for the large issuer, and $10,000 for the small
issuer. This is, recall, on a transaction that Mann tells us typically sells
for around $2,500, so that if Mann's information is accurate, then a
significant fraction of the cost of a letter of credit would have to
consist of reputational rents. These calculations imply, somewhat
implausibly, that the letter-of-credit divisions of commercial banks
should earn profits well in excess of the normal economic return to
capital.
Compare this figure with the likely expected costs of enforcing a
letter of credit through the judicial system. Taking a lawsuit all the
way to final judicial disposition is not cheap, but most letters of credit
never lead to any dispute, because the formalistic rules of letter-of-
credit law considerably streamline the resolution of any disputes that
do arise, facilitating disposition or settlement at an early stage of the
process. 14 Most significant in this regard is what specialists in the area
13. The calculation is as follows: profits of $100 per transaction times 1,000 transactions
per year equals $100,000 per year. The present value of $100,000 per year indefinitely, at an
interest rate of 10%, is $100,000/.10 = $1 million.
14. Indeed, the formality of letter-of-credit law is regularly justified by experts in the
field by the need to keep legal enforcement quick, cheap, and certain. See, e.g., JOHN F.
DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETrERS OF CREDIT: COMMERCIAL AND STANDBY CREDITS
(Warren et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991) at 2-55,3-23,3-24; U.C.C. § 5-103, cmt. 1 (1999).
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refer to as the "independence principle": that is, liability under the
letter of credit is both formally and substantively independent of the
underlying contractual transaction it supports. Once the beneficiary
demonstrates that she has presented conforming documents,
accordingly, she is entitled to judgment. There is no need for her to
demonstrate anything at all about the underlying contract; indeed,
whether she is entitled to payment under the underlying contract is
legally irrelevant." Similarly, the issuer's available defenses to liability
are quite limited. An issuer or applicant can avoid paying claims that
are materially fraudulent or based on forged documents, but the
standards of proof of fraud are high.16 The current version of U.C.C.
Article 5 formalizes the enforcement process even further, introducing
several changes from prior law that are plainly intended to discourage
interpretative disputes.' As an illustrative calculation, then, even if as
many as one out of every fifty letters of credit led to litigation
(certainly too high a figure) and the costs of litigation were as high as
$50,000 (possibly too low, but not that low if the case is settled or
resolved on the pleadings), this would still imply an expected
enforcement cost of only $1,000 per transaction - half of what we
estimated was necessary to support an equivalent reputational
sanction.
Even if it turned out that reputational enforcement were generally
cheaper than legal enforcement, furthermore, providing for both
enforcement mechanisms would give the beneficiary an option to
enforce with whatever sanction turned out ex post to be cheaper in the
individual case. Like any other option, the availability of this option
has positive value. Even if unused in the majority of cases, it would
lower the beneficiary's expected costs of enforcing the bank's
representations.
15. This central aspect of the letter of credit is part of its legal definition. U.C.C. § 5-
102(a)(10) (1999), defining "letter of credit," and § 5-102(a)(6), defining "document,"
provide that letters of credit can condition payment only on the presentation of specified
records. Similarly, the Comptroller of the Currency's Interpretive Ruling 7.7016,12 C.F.R. §
7.7016 (1994), directs that "As a matter of sound banking practice,... the bank must not be
called upon to determine questions of fact or law at issue between the account party and the
beneficiary."
16. And these standards have been heightened by the 1995 revision to the statute.
Compare revised § 5-109 (requiring "material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or
applicant") with old § 5-114 (employing broader and vaguer standard of "fraud in the
transaction").
17. See, e.g., new § 5-102(a)(7) (defining good faith as mere "honesty in fact," in contrast
to the more equitable standard of "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing" found
in Article 2 and the proposed revision to Article 1); new § 5-108(a) (substituting a strict
compliance principle for the doctrines of waiver and estoppel that would otherwise apply
under section 1-103); new § 5-108(e) (making the question of the issuer's compliance with
the standard practice of financial institutions a question for the court and not the jury); new §
5-111(a) (eliminating consequential damages and, more strikingly, the duty to mitigate
damages); and new § 5-111(e) (providing that courts must award attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party in any dispute that arises over the issuer's duty to pay).
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If legal enforceability would lower the cost to the parties of sending
a credible signal of the buyer's creditworthiness, why don't the parties
structure letters of credit so that as a regular matter they are formally
as well as practically binding on the issuer? The costs of document
preparation is no answer, since the parties could if they wished write
the documentary conditions more liberally, so as to cover the
incomplete documents that Mann shows that beneficiaries routinely
submit and issuers and applicants routinely honor. Under U.C.C.
Article 5, it is left entirely to the parties to determine which specific
documents might serve as a condition for drawing on a letter of credit;
it is even possible to condition the payment upon the mere
presentation of a draft together with the beneficiary's conclusory
statement that payment is due (the so-called "clean" letter of credit).
Why, instead, do the parties write the conditions strictly instead of
liberally?
That they do so deliberately seems inescapable. Mann's interview
evidence backs up this conclusion, and for even more striking
evidence, one need only look to the history of the recent revision of
Article 5.11 There, not only did the official drafting committee and
representatives of the letter-of-credit industry quickly agree on the
importance of adopting a legal standard of strict compliance with
documentary conditions, but the industry successfully lobbied the
drafters to maintain and even to strengthen legal rules that maintained
their discretion to insist on strict compliance with documentary
conditions as a condition of liability, but waive it broadly in practice.9
To summarize, the main theoretical puzzle raised by Mann's
empirical findings remains. As he has shown, the parties to letters of
credit go to substantial expense to cast their transactions in a legal
form that, if designed appropriately and complied with by the seller,
would provide a cheap and reliable method of enforcing the buyer's
obligation to pay. But he also shows that in the majority of
transactions the parties do not actually use this method to secure
payment, instead preferring to rely on informal methods backed up by
reputational sanctions. Mann's suggested explanation for his findings
is that the parties are interested in verifying the buyer's reliability to
the seller, not in legal liability per se. But his explanation turns out to
be unconvincing once we recognize that a letter of credit backed up by
reputational sanctions alone is likely to be a more expensive
18. See James J. White, The Impact of Internationalization of Transnational Commercial
Law: The Influence of International Practice on the Revision of Article 5 of the UCC, 6 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & BUs. 189 (1995) (describing in particular the lobbying efforts of the U.S. Council
on International Banking).
19. See id. at 205, 208. According to White, the bankers were particularly concerned
about the U.C.C.'s duty of good faith, which they feared would bind them to exercise their
discretion to waive strict compliance consistently across cases, or to pay when documents
substantially (but not strictly) conformed.
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verification device than is either a lesser document backed up by the
same reputational sanctions, or the same letter of credit backed up by
legal sanctions. Thus, assuming they are economically rational, buyers
and sellers who go to the expense of purchasing letters of credit must
be buying something more than verification of the buyer's reliability.
What, then, are they buying?
3. THE PROBLEM OF BILATERAL INCENTIVES IN LONG-DISTANCE
TRANSACTIONS
As I have already indicated, the answer likely lies in the bilateral
nature of the incentive and informational problems facing long-
distance buyers and sellers. Just as the seller is worried about the
buyer's performance so is the buyer worried about the seller's. Just as
the seller finds it difficult to acquire reliable credit information about
an unknown customer in a distant location, and wishes to avoid the
burdens of litigation in a foreign jurisdiction, so does the buyer. Thus,
the buyer and the seller have similar need for verification of each
other's contractual reliability.
If the parties arranged for prepayment by the buyer, or if they used
a letter of credit with minimal documentary conditions, the seller
would have little reason to worry about the buyer's performance, but
the buyer would have significantly greater reason to worry about the
seller's. Conversely, if the parties arranged for shipment on account,
or relied entirely on the reputational interests of the buyer's bank to
ensure buyer performance, the buyer would have greater protection,
and the seller would have less. Using the letter of credit in the way
that Mann describes, however, provides an intermediate solution that
balances the verification and enforcement needs of buyer and seller.
Furthermore, the very feature than Mann highlights - the fact that
documentary conditions are set strictly as a matter of legal formality,
but waived liberally in ordinary practice - may be the key that
enables the device to motivate performance on both sides.
In order to see how this could be possible, consider the following
alternate account of letters of credit, based on a set of admittedly
stylized but empirically plausible assumptions. The first assumption is
that in the period leading up to contractual performance, both the
buyer and the seller receive some information that gives them some
indication whether the other side is likely to perform. This
information comes from a variety of communications and signals -
exchange of preliminary documents such as specifications,
conversations between agents, requests for modification, third-party
market reports, and the like. The parties regard the information as
reliable in that they have reason to think it accurate, but it is soft
information, not of the sort that can be corroborated with reasonable
cost or accuracy by a third-party enforcer such as a court or arbitrator.
2564 [Vol. 98:2554
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In the terminology of the modem economic literature on incomplete
contracting, then, the information is observable but not verifiable.2
Because a court cannot verify the information, the parties cannot
directly condition their legal obligations on it, whether in a letter of
credit or otherwise. Because the parties can observe such information
on their own, however, there is no reason they cannot condition their
actual behavior on it. In particular, the seller's decision whether to
submit documents that conform to the conditions of a letter of credit,
and the buyer's decision whether to waive any nonconformities, can
depend on such soft information.
Second, suppose that there is a variety of concrete actions that the
parties can take that are correlated with, but not equivalent to,
substantive contractual performance. This category would include the
preparation of invoices and packing lists, procurement of inspection
certificates and bills of lading, and so on. Because such actions are
costly, both parties would prefer to avoid or minimize them if this can
be done without putting at risk the underlying exchange. On the other
hand, because of their relative concreteness and formality, such
actions are both observable and verifiable by third-party enforcers at
low cost. Thus, in contrast to the soft information described
previously, they are contractible - that is, they can be used to
condition legally enforceable obligations and can form the basis for
the documentary terms of a letter of credit.
Under these assumptions, a seller who has sent signals of reliability
to a buyer through informal channels does not need to concern herself
as much with strict formal compliance with the documentary terms of
a letter of credit. Because the buyer can tell that performance is likely
to be forthcoming notwithstanding any documentary discrepancies, he
is more likely to waive such discrepancies when they occur. The seller,
anticipating such waiver, can thus save on the costs of formal
documentation, complying substantially but not strictly.
Conversely, a seller whose underlying performance has been
deficient will face greater difficulties obtaining payment, just because a
buyer who has received signals of the deficiency through informal
channels will be less likely to waive any documentary defects. A seller
who anticipates such difficulties, of course, can protect herself by
going to greater efforts to ensure that she has strictly complied with all
the documentary conditions; for instance, the seller could engage a
commercial specialist, such as a confirming bank, to check her
documents to make sure they are free of error. Such protection,
however, comes at a cost, for as Mann's informal survey indicates,
banks charge for such a service.
20. See Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICrIoNARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 277 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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Given this framework, the costs of strict documentary compliance,
combined with the threat that the buyer will refuse to waive formal
defects and the seller will be forced to collect through an expensive
legal proceeding, reinforce the seller's incentive to perform the
underlying contract substantively. Substantive performance of the
underlying contract, of course, is what the buyer is really interested in,
not documentary compliance per se. But the potential enforcement of
the documentary conditions, which are cheaply verifiable by a third
party, operates as a substitute for enforcement of substantive
performance, which is expensive for a third party to verify. The fact
that enforcement of the documentary conditions is rare - in most
instances they operate as an out-of-equilibrium threat - makes them
even cheaper to enforce.
In order for this device to work, however, the seller must be
assured that if she does perform substantively, the buyer will not seize
on documentary noncompliance as an excuse not to pay. For if the
seller lacks such assurance, she will need to undertake the expense of
strict compliance to guard against such buyer opportunism, in which
case the prospect of saving on document expenses can no longer
operate as a reward for substantive performance. And this is where
the issuing bank comes into the picture: as a monitor who supervises
the buyer to ensure that he does not opportunistically enforce the
documentary terms in situations where there has been no defect in the
underlying substantive performance.
Note the distinction between the bank's role in this account of
letters of credit, and the bank's role in Mann's account. Under my
account, the bank's verification role is more limited than Mann
indicates. The bank does not provide any general verification of the
buyer's financial condition or commercial reliability. Rather, it
provides the more specific verification that the buyer will honor the
implicit bargain under which the documentary conditions are waived
whenever there is no apparent substantive defect.
Second and similarly, the bank's incentives to perform this task are
sharper than in Mann's account. Under his story, in contrast, the
bank's incentive is purely reputational; if the buyer does not pay,
future sellers will assume that the bank's client base is less financially
reliable. Under my story, there is also a reputational incentive, but
there is a legal incentive too, since the seller always retains the option
of submitting complying documents. In most cases she will not wish to
exercise this option, of course, since she can obtain payment without
going to such expense. But if the buyer is operating in bad faith or is
otherwise planning to breach the underlying contract, the seller will
likely receive some advance signal of this fact and will make greater
efforts to submit complying documents. The threat that the seller will
actually comply with the letter of credit, thus placing the bank legally
2566 [Vol. 98:2554
Bilateral Assurance
on the hook, gives the bank an incentive both to monitor the buyer for
substantive compliance ex post, as well as to screen the buyer ex ante.
Moreover, the bank's reputational incentives are themselves more
focused than Mann's account would suggest. According to his
account, the market treats nonpayment of a letter of credit as a signal
of general financial risk; because future sellers will regard the buyer
(and the bank's client base more generally) as more likely to default
on their contractual obligations, they will avoid dealing with this bank
and buyer in the future or will insist on a larger risk premium in
exchange for doing so. But as I have argued above, such a signal is
weak. Lacking information about the specific transaction, the market
will not be able easily to distinguish between cases in which there is
actual breach and cases in which there is not, or between substantive
risk and all the other reasons that might explain the rejection of a
documentary presentation. Under my account, however, such
distinctions need not be drawn, since the rejection of a substantially
complying presentation is undesirable in itself. With each such
rejection, the market will increasingly regard the bank as a stickler for
details, and as having a client base made up of similar sticklers for
detail. Future sellers will thus anticipate that if they take letters of
credit from this buyer or bank, they will have to undertake additional
costs of documentary compliance. This anticipated cost increase, then,
will lead sellers to raise their price in a corresponding amount when
dealing with the bank's future applicants on a letter-of-credit basis;
and this will reduce the amount that applicants are willing to pay for a
letter of credit in the first place.
The letter of credit thus operates as a bilateral formal enforcement
device that in most cases does not need to be used. When the soft
information coming through informal channels indicates that the
parties will perform adequately, the seller can afford to cut comers on
documentary compliance and the buyer can afford to waive the
resultant defects. When the soft information indicates the possibility
of breach, however, both parties will want to behave in a more
legalistic fashion. But since the vast majority of contracts are
performed rather than breached, the insistence on formalities is the
relatively rare event.
This bilateral enforcement model offered above, if accurate, thus
explains why the parties choose letters of credit, why the parties
routinely choose formal conditions that are stricter than they plan to
insist on in practice, why almost all letters of credit are paid
notwithstanding their technical noncompliance with documentary
terms, and why letters of credit are priced in proportion to their face
value. The parties choose letters of credit because, unlike an ordinary
credit reference, they motivate the seller's substantive performance as
well as the buyer's. They choose formal conditions stricter than they
plan to enforce in practice so that the costs of formal compliance,
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together with the buyer's discretion to refuse payment when the
formal conditions are not met, reinforce the seller's incentives to
perform substantively. Most letters of credit are paid in practice
because most of the underlying substantive contracts are performed
according to the buyer's expectation - that is, the device is effective.
And letters of credit are priced according to their face value because,
in most cases, the issuing bank is actually called upon to pay; thus, its
expected costs of float and default risk are, in equilibrium, roughly
proportional to the size of the credit.21
Note that my story fits reasonably well with the specific data Mann
uncovers relating to the nature of discrepancy and waiver. There is no
indication in his data that buyers are willing to waive documentary
discrepancies in cases where there has been substantive contractual
breach. Almost 60% of the defects he identifies involve technical
defects that have little to do with the underlying bargain, and of the
28% that he classifies as substantive, over half consist of late or short
shipment, which may not be a breach at all from either the legal or the
practical viewpoint.'
Note further that this bilateral enforcement model comports with
the traditional scholarly account of the letter of credit that Mann
claims to rebut. According to Mann, the traditional explanation
"hinges on the seller's having a reliable and assured right to payment"
from the issuing bank; whereas in fact most sellers submit defective
documents and hence have "no right to payment at all."' But here
Mann is confusing the existence of a right with its exercise. Because
the seller retains the option to present formally complying documents,
she does ultimately have the legal right to compel payment. Because
of the effectiveness of the informal channels of information and
nonlegal enforcement, she usually chooses not to go to the trouble of
establishing the preconditions of legal enforcement. But in this regard
she is no different than many if not most contracting parties who
choose to enter into legally binding arrangements.
The way in which waiver operates in the letter-of-credit setting,
indeed, exemplifies its role in contractual relations and contract law
21. The administrative costs of processing payment admittedly do not vary with the size
of the credit, but these processing costs may be small. In addition, reputational costs could
either be fixed or variable, but, in equilibrium, reputational costs don't need to be paid.
22. Under both U.C.C. Article 2 and the U.N. Convention for the International Sale of
Goods ("CISO"), quantity and delivery terms are supplemented by trade usage, course of
dealing, course of performance, and any obligations arising out of the commercial principle
of good faith. Under the CISG, parol evidence and other precontractual communications
also enter into the bargain. Thus the seller's actual duty to ship under the contract may be
quite different from that indicated in the letter of credit or other written documents. More
importantly, even if the buyer has the technical legal right to reject the goods or claim
damages for a nonconforming shipment, they may be perfectly adequate to his needs as a
practical matter, especially after a price adjustment.
23. Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit, supra note 1, at 2496.
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generally. Lisa Bernstein has argued, for instance, that contracting
parties routinely place legal conditions in their agreements that they
fully expect to waive.24 This is not because they value compliance with
such conditions in itself, but because the threat value of the conditions
helps economize on the costs of contract enforcement. In Bernstein's
view, the formal conditions are not intended to govern the parties'
effective rights and duties in the context of a successful ongoing
relationship. Rather, they are "endgame" norms to be invoked only in
the event that the relationship breaks down.28 Similarly, Robert Scott
has argued that repossession, acceleration clauses, and other
supposedly coercive provisions in debtor-creditor contracts are best
understood as formal threats that serve to economize on monitoring
and enforcement of the debtor's obligations, and that in most cases are
not intended to be carried out.26 Benjamin Klein and Richard Epstein
have defended traditional at-will termination provisions in franchise
and employment contracts on analogous grounds.
It is an essential part of all these authors' accounts that such formal
conditions be maintained as part of the parties' legally enforceable
obligations, and not be watered down by doctrines such as waiver,
good faith, or course of performance. Otherwise they will lose their
threat value, and their resultant ability to support the parties' implicit
relational expectations. Under the modern American law of contracts,
however, the enforceability of such conditions has generally been
eroding in just this fashion over the course of past decades. 8 Indeed,
Bernstein has argued that the failure of courts to enforce strict
compliance has been a major factor in the decision of private
commercial actors to opt out of public enforcement and into private
enforcement systems that do not recognize or substantially cut back on
antiformalist doctrines such as waiver. As the earlier discussion has
made clear, however, such incursions on strict compliance have for the
most part been kept out of the law of letters of credit.
The more conventional wisdom of the scholarly literature on
contracts, of course, is that the duty of good faith and similar
restrictions on the untrammeled exercise of strict compliance are
24. See Lisa Bernstein, Formalism in Commercial Law: The Questionable Empirical
Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CRI. L. REV. 710
(1999) [hereinafter Bernstein, Formalism in Commercial Law].
25. See id. at 766.
26. See Scott, Coercive Creditor Remedies, supra note 8.
27. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CI. L. REV. 947,
956-76 (1984); Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of 'Unfair' Contractual
Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 356 (1980).
28. See, e.g., Bernstein, Formalism in Commercial Law, supra note 24; Robert Scott, The
Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code
Methodologies, in JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMMERCIAL LAW (J. Kraus and
S. Walt eds.) (forthcoming 2000).
2569August 2000]
Michigan Law Review
necessary to prevent opportunism on the part of the party with the
discretion and to encourage relational investment on the part of the
party who is vulnerable. In the franchise context, for instance, Gillian
Hadfield has argued that the doctrine of good faith is an essential limit
on the franchisor's right to terminate the franchise contract at will; else
franchisors will be able to expropriate franchisee investments and
extort one-sided modifications to the franchise contract.2 9 Stewart
Schwab has similarly argued in the employment context that limits on
at-will termination are necessary to protect employees' expectations
and induce them to invest in human capital."
If Mann's reputational story (as modified according to my
proposed amendments) is correct, furthermore, then it also makes
sense that the legal doctrine of strict compliance should be applied
more formally in letter-of-credit law than in contract law generally.
Such a distinction is sensible because in the letter-of-credit context,
there is a credible reputational intermediary - the issuing bank -
that has the ability and incentive to police the buyer-applicant so that
he doesn't exercise his discretion opportunistically. In the ordinary
two-party context, in contrast, such assurance is harder to find; it must
come from the reputational interests of the party vested with
discretion (as in Klein, Scott, and Epstein's account) or from the
community of traders generally (as in Bernstein's).
4. LOOKING MORE CLOSELY AT THE DATA
In order for my revision of Mann's story to be more than a mere
theoretical hypothesis, of course, it needs to be backed up by the data.
In this regard, it is useful to identify the empirical predictions that my
revision generates. If I am right, then we should expect to see letters
of credit enforced strictly not just when the buyer's performance is
uncertain, but also when seller performance is uncertain, when it is
relatively costly to enforce the underlying substantive contractual
arrangements, when other commitment devices are unavailable or
uneconomical, and when the issuing bank's reputation is relatively
weak. Similarly, we should expect to see high rates of noncompliance
with formal conditions (and high rates of waiver) not just when buyer
performance is relatively reliable, but also when seller performance is
relatively reliable, when sellers have low-cost alternatives to
contractual enforcement, and when the issuing bank's reputation is
relatively strong.
29. See Gillian Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1990)
30. See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993).
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Mann's data, as reported, are not rich enough to test all of these
hypotheses simultaneously, let alone determine their relative
importance. Because he looks only at bank records and at letter-of-
credit transactions in particular, his data cannot tell us what factors
systematically influence buyers and sellers to use letters of credit as
opposed to other contractual assurance devices. To answer that
question, it would be necessary to collect similarly detailed
information about buyers and sellers using other devices.
Furthermore, because his information about individual buyers and
sellers is limited to a few variables, and because his sample of banks is
too small for him to consider bank characteristics as possible
explanatory variables, it does not tell us much about the transactional
factors that determine the risk of opportunism, and hence the rate of
compliance and waiver. Some of the material that he recounts from
his qualitative interviews, to be sure, is quite suggestive in this respect.
For instance, the hypothesis that opportunism is more likely in
contracts for the sale of commodities than in contracts for finished
goods, because markets for the former are typically characterized by
greater price fluctuations, is entirely plausible." Similar hypotheses
could be put forward regarding the specialized or nonspecialized
nature of the goods, the thickness of the market to which they are
being shipped, or their perishability. But, unfortunately, Mann's
statistical analysis does not distinguish among transactions involving
different types of goods, even though he states that he collected data
on the type of good being traded.32
Mann does divide his sample into import and export transactions,
and calculates the rate of discrepancy and waiver for each. But this
single variable, however, is not sufficient to allow us to distinguish
among the various possible explanations discussed above. Mann
suggests, for instance, that the relatively high rate of discrepancies on
letters of credit associated with shipments coming into the United
States is due to the relative reliability of American compared with
foreign buyers 3 But the difference could also be attributable to the
greater reliability of foreign sellers, the stronger commercial
reputations of U.S. banks, or the greater sophistication of U.S. buyers
or foreign sellers in collecting and assessing the soft information that
allows the parties to save on the costs of strict formal compliance. The
evidence is thus overdetermined; in order to identify the relative
importance of these various hypotheses, we need more variables and a
method of statistical analysis (such as multiple regression), that allows
us to consider the separate effect of each variable on the data.
31. See Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit, supra note 1, at 2511.
32. See id. at 2497.
33. See id. at 2509.
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One obvious possibility would be to distinguish not just between
import and export transactions, but between transactions going into
and coming out of different countries. Mann indicates that his data set
includes the country of origin and shipment for each contract; it would
be a reasonably straightforward matter to divide the sample into
developed and less developed countries, capitalist and command
economies, or countries with well-established legal systems and
countries in transition. Such classifications would require some
amount of subjective judgment, but the categories would not have to
be perfect to be useful, and a variety of proxies such as OECD or
WTO are available. Depending on how many countries were
involved, the sample size of 500 might even be large enough to permit
the use of individual country dummy variables without sacrificing
overall statistical significance. But given the number of possible
theoretical explanations, a more detailed statistical analysis is in order,
appears possible on the existing data set, and would appear to promise
substantial additional insight.
Going beyond Mann's current study, it would be desirable to
collect similar information from a larger number of issuing banks, so
that individual bank characteristics could be added into the statistical
analysis. Mann's qualitative interviews did reveal some differences in
bank policy; for example, his midwestern bank appeared to be more
formalistic in reviewing letters of credit, and less interventionist in
pressuring its applicants to waive defects, than were the other regional
and national banks he surveyed. This difference, if accurate, could be
attributable to the midwestern bank's customer base or to the type of
transactions it tended to finance. For instance, perhaps its letter-of-
credit business included a larger fraction of agricultural sales than
other banks, and agricultural shipments are subject to a greater risk of
opportunism than other sales contracts, perhaps due to the effects of
weather and price fluctuations. On the other hand, it could also be the
case that the bank, because of its relatively small size or more limited
experience in financing letter-of-credit transactions, was less able to
signal its reliability or evaluate soft information coming from abroad.
With the current data set, one can do no better than Mann does in
speculating based on individual anecdotes, but with a larger and more
diverse sample, it would be possible to be more systematic.
5. CONCLUSION
Ronald Mann's information-verification theory of letters of credit
is instructive, original, and important, but incomplete. It is incomplete
in two respects. First, by focusing primarily on the seller's need to
verify the buyer's reliability, he ignores the buyer's symmetric need to
verify the seller's reliability. Second and more subtly, he presents the
need for verification as an alternate and mutually exclusive
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explanation to the traditional account of letters of credit that
emphasizes payment assurance, and thus he fails to recognize how
verification and payment assurance operate in practice as
complements rather than substitutes. More precisely, the fact that
letters of credit are usually presented with documentary deficiencies
that would preclude their legal enforcement does not mean that legal
enforceability is not an important part of their commercial value.
Rather, the threat of such enforceability is what provides the bank
with the incentive to carry out its verification task credibly and
cheaply, and conversely, the possibility of verification is what permits
the parties to avoid in most instances the costs of actually carrying out
that threat.
At least as important as Mann's theoretical contribution, however,
is the empirical information he has unearthed. His study shows
convincingly that the traditional payment-assurance account of letters
of credit is inadequate; whatever one makes of his conclusions, the
survey and transactional data he has collected substantially enrich our
understanding of this commercial device and of the markets in which it
is used. It is now up to commercial law scholars more generally to
build on this groundwork, to develop more sophisticated accounts of
letters of credit and similar contractual arrangements, and, following
his example, to find ways to test those accounts against the data.
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